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IN THE SUP.REME COURT
of the
STA'TE OF UTAH
LARRY NICHOLSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, AMERICANA CORPORATION and FIREMEN'S FUND
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No.

9888

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATEMEN·T OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a claim for compensation benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Utah for injury sustained by the plaintiff in an accident which he claims
arose out of, or in the course of, his empl~oyment.
DISPOSITION BEFORE INDUSTRIAL·
COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission determined that the accident did not arise out of, or in the course of plaintiff's
employment, and that therefore he was not entitled to
compensation, and denied his application.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT
Defendants seek an affirmance of the order of the
Industrial Oommission.
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8TATEiliEN·T OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in plaintiff's brief
reflects the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Defendant employer and its insurance carrier,
having prevailed in the Industrial Commission, are entitled to have the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to them, and to have the order affirmed if
there is any substantial evidence in the record to support
it. We therefore deem it necessary to state here the
evidence supporting the Commission's Findings and Conclusions.
The record before this court is in two parts, each
of which is separately numbered. We accordingly refer
to pages in the record both by the part number and the
page number.
The record is replete with evidence .as to the occurrence of the accident which is at variance With the plaintiff's claim as to how the accident occurred. There is
considerable evidence to support the Commission's findings that the accident occurred as plaintiff was completing the process of washing and tidying up his car,
something wholly unrelated to his employment. ~fore
over, even if the accident occurred as testified by the
plaintiff at the hearing, the Commiss:i:on would have
been justified in determining that it did not arise out
of, or in the course of his employment, and therefore he
was not entitled to compensati'On benefits. We consider
the evidence from these two points of view, under separate headings.
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A. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
WHICH WOULD WARRANT TilE COMMISSION IN REFUSING TO BELIEVE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY AS TO HOW THE
ACCIDENT OCCURRED, AND IN FINDING
THAT THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE
PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE PROCESS OF
CLEANING HIS CAR, AND WAS NOT IN
ANY vVAY CONNECTED WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT.

~u

The original surgical report of Dr. Oliver Richards,
contains the foll'Owing:
1. Statement of Patient as to How Injury was
Sustained: "While attempting to fasten hoo:k on elasticized strap of terry cloth seat covers that had come unhooked, the hook slipped out of hand and flipped back
and pierced right eye." (R. Part 1, p. 2). Apparently
plaintiff made no mention to his attending physician
of having removed a sales kit in connection with the
occurrence of the accident.

~r.·

In employee's own application f'Or compensation
benefits he stated: "Applicant was removing sales kit
from rear seat of automobile. Elasticized strap on seat
cover flipped and punctured his right e;ye." (R. Part
1, p. 4). Although in that statement applicant claimed
that he was in the process of removing his sales kit,
he states that it was in the actual process of removing
the kit that the pin was caused to flip, rather than that
the plaintiff subsequently flipped the pin in attemping
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to replace it after it was disloged while the sales kit
was being removed. However, when he testified as to
how the accident occurred at the hearing, plaintiff testified that in sliding the· :kit out of the car, he knocked loose
one of the straps. He then set the kit on the ground
and was in the process of attempting to refasten the
strap when the accident occurred. (R. Part 1, p. 43).
Plaintiff admitted that prior to the occurrence of
the accident, he had taken his automobile over to the
home of Dean Ellis to wash it. He had no particular
reason to take it over there. He sponged it off and put
it in order over there. (R. Part 2, pp. 76-77). Under
his own testimony the,refore, the strap could have come
loose as he was tidying the car up.
Mter the first hearing of this matter before this
court, Dr. Richards wrote a letter to the Industrial Commission in which he stated that plaintiff "sustained a
penetrating injury into his eye from some type of stretch
hook that he was using to place seat covers in his car,
which car he uses for his salesman activities, therefore
lill!king this injury to his employment status." (R. Part
2, p. 1).
Dean Ellis also testified that plaintiff had straightened his car up before the accident. (R. Part 2, pp. 17, 26).
L~orna

Linford, former mother-in-law of the plaintiff,
testified that he had told her that he was washing his
car and putting new seat covers on. As he was completing this operation, a pin slipped and hit him in the eye.
(R. Part 2, pp. 35·, 36, 37 and 58). He also told her that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
he "briefed" Dean Ellis before the first hearing. He
further told her that he was going to take the insurance
company for "all they were worth." (R. Part 2, pp.
39-40).
Leo Linford, former father-in-law of the plaintiff,
testified that Dean Ellis said, in the presence of the
plaintiff and various others, that plaintiff was putting
seat covers on his car after having washed it and the
last hook sprung and hit him in the eye. ( R. part 2,
p. 63.) He further testified that the plaintiff himself,
related the same story in his hospital room, on the
night of the aceident. (R. Part 2, p. 73); .and that he
also related the same story to the witness on a later
occasion, after he was out of the hospital. (R. Part 2,
p. 64). Plaintiff also told Mr. Linford that he had
"worked out an angle" where he thought he could get
the money. ''He figured that by stating that he was
working at the time that he could come under the rule
of the insurance company that he was employed at the
time." (R. Part 2, pp. 64-65). He also mentioned "that
he was going to have to work on ... Ellis, so that he'd
have the same story.... " (R. part 2, p. 65). Plaintiff
himself admitted that he had unhooked the straps of
the seat covers and shook them out. (R. Part 2, p. 79.)
The Commission, in its order, matkes it perfectly
clear that it accepts the testimony of the Linfords, rather
than the testimony of the plaintiff. " ... we choose to
believe the testimony of Lorna Linford . . . and Leo
George Linford." (R. part 2, p. 95). While ill feelings
toward the plaintiff were frankly admitted by both of
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these witnesses, this alone does not make their testimony
unworthy of belief. They certainly had no greater motive
to testify dishonestly than did plaintiff himself, who
had a substantial financial stake in the outcome of the
proceedings. The referee had the opportunity, as this
court does not, of observing the appe.aran0e and demeanor
of the witnesses on the stand-an advantaged position
in determining their relative credibility. Also, as pointed
out in the order, it seems more probable that an .accident
of the type which befell plaintiff, would occur in the
process of replacing seat covers, than in the process of
removing the sales kit from the automobile. (R. Part
2, p. 94).
B. EVE.N IF THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED .A·S
CLAIMED BY PL,AINTIFF, THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S FINDING
THAT IT DID NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
Plaintiff's employment duties, as defined in his own
testimony at the original hearing, were .as follows: His
"work consisted of making appointments with prospective customers and then going out and giving them a
pitch." (R. Part 1, p. 20). He was compensated on a
commission basis for sales actually made. (R. Part 1,
pp. 24, 52). He definitely was not paid for teaching
other salesmen sales pitches or assisting in their training. In particular, he was not paid anything to teach
Dean Ellis the sales pitch on the Harvard Classics. It
was common in the organization for older salesmen to
help younger ones as a matter of being a good neighbor,
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or ingratiating themselves to their employer. (R. Part
1, pp. 56-67' 60, 90-91).
It is clear from plaintiff's own testimony at the
original hearing, that his purpose in going to Ellis' home
was not to teach him the sales pitch. He just happened
to have a little free time and decided to utilize it by
giving Ellis the pitch. His exact testimony was as follows: "Well, since we have a little time right now, ...
Just a minute, I'll go get the kit, because I'll have to
organize it before I can ma:ke a pitch, and I'll run
through, take a half hour and show you the classics."
(R. Part 1, p. 41). It was further established without
dispute, that there were persons in the Americana organization, namely trainers and district managers, who did
receive compensation in assisting in the training of salesmen. (R. Part 1, pp. 56, 90, 116). However, plaintiff
was not designated as such an employee. (R. Part 1,
pp. 56, 90, 116).
Similar evidence was also developed from the witness Dean Ellis at the last hearing. He testified that
it was common for salesmen to help one another with
pitches, but that they were not compensated for this,
or for helping others. (R. Part 2, pp. 31-32). Salesmen
were paid strictly on a commission basis. (R. part 2,
p. 32).
Beyond any dispute whatsover, plaintiff was not
giving, or preparing to give, a sales pitch to a prospective
customer. The most that could be claimed for his activity
would be that he was preparing to put his materials in
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order for use later in the day in the presentation of
sales pitches. This would be no more "work related'~
than taking his automobile to a service station to be
fueled; reviewing sales material at home before departing on a sales trip; or for that matter, getting up in the
morning and dressing .and performing his toilet. All,
in a sense, would be necessary steps to be taken before
actually starting the performance of his duties. But they
are not "work connected" in the ordinary sense of that
term. They do not represent hazards of employment,
but rather, hazards of every day living. If plaintiff's
activity in this case can be said to "arise out of, or in
the course of" his employment as that term is used in
the Compensation Act, there would appear to be no
limit as to the type of accidents for which an employer
m.ay be held liable. Substantial evidence supports the
Commission's finding that the accident did not arise
"out of, or in the course of" plaintiff's employment as
a commission salesman.
ARGUMENT
As we understand the position of the plaintiff in
this case, he contends that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the Commission; that the findings of the Commission .are therefore arbitrary and capricious, and that the findings
should be set aside and the order of the Commission
reversed. In other words, plaintiff contends that the
evidence compels a finding in his favor.
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The scope of review of an industrial proceeding by
this court is set forth in Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953,
which, insofar as material here, reads as follows :
"The review shall not be extended further than to
determine:
"(1) Whether or not the commission acted without
or in excess of its powers.
"(2) If findings of fact are made, whether or not
such findings of fact support the award under revieiW."
We also invite the court's attention to the language
of Section 35-1-85, U.C.A., 1953, which reads, in part, as
follows:
"The findings and conclusions of the commission on que,stions of f~act shaU be conclusive
and final and shall not be subject to review; such
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and
the findings and conclusions of the Commission."
(Italics ours.)

,'y'

These two statutes circumscribe the scope and extent
of review by this court of industrial proceedings. Almost
from the inception of the Compensation Act, they have
been before this court for review in innumerable cases,
and this court has unwaveringly followed both the' letter
and the spirit of the statutes. The rule of decision was
well stated by this Court in the early case of Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Ind. Comm., 56 Utah 90, 189 P. 69.
It was there said :
"The only question raised and presented to
this court for consideration is whether or not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
there is. any substantial testimony in the record
which tends to support the finding of the Commission * * *

"* * * It would subserve no good purpose
to review the testimony in detail which tends to
support the conflicting theories of the respective
parties. In this class of cases, under our statutes,
this court is confined to a review of the testimony
and findings of the Commission for the sole
purpose of determining whether or not there is
any substantial evidence in the record to support
the award .... If there is any subst,antial evidence
in t'he record to support the filndings of the Commission ,and the ultimate facts found by the: Commission support the awar.d, we as a reviewing
court, under our statutes, cannot do otherwise
than enter judgment affirming the award made
by the Commission." (Italics ours.)
The above rule was restated and reaffirmed in a
long line of cases following that decision. However,
notwithstanding the ofrt reiterated exposition of the rule,
cases attac:king the findings of the Commission continued
to come before this court, and in the case of Adams v.
Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 157, 246 P. 364, this court, apparently somewhat annoyed at the need for restating the
rule so frequently, admonished the bar as follows:
"Counsel and litigants in these cases should
understand once and for all that this court is
powerless to review the evidence except for the
purposes heretofore frequently declared by the
court in a long series of well-considered cases.

•••

"This court is now firmly committed to the
doctrine that it will examine into the evidence
only to ascertain whether there is any substantial
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evidence in support of the findings of the commission and whether it has either acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction. * * * "
There followed another long line of decisions to the
same effect, but it again became necessary for this
court to lecture the bar of the state in the case· of Leventis
v. Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 174, 35 P.2d 770 in the
following terms :
"In view of the record and the findings of
the commission, our course is an open highway,
marked by an unbroken line of decisions which
have the support of both natural justice and of
common sense. The principles involved are so
limpid and axiomatic that their recitation or a
citation thereof would be an adscititious burden.
Therefore, we move straight toward a conclusion.
In all respects the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, which this court can
neither weigh nor review, as the commissioners
are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the we.ight of the evidence." (Emphasis our.)
Even s·tronger language was used in the case of
Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm., 84
Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979. It was there said:
"It seems daft and unjuristic, certainly malapropos, that this court should be required to
repeatedly expostulate with legists about principles so well established, and to so frequently
reaffirm that the findings and conclusions of the
commission on questions of fact (J)re conclusive,
and final and are not subject to review .... and
that they cannot be disturbed unless it appears
as a matter of law that they ,(J)re contfiary to law
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and contrary to the evidence. We cawnot weigh
conflicting evidence, nor direct which of the two
or more re,asonable inferences ought to be drawn
firom evidence not in conflict. * * * In the determining of facts the conclusions of the commission
are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be
interfered with by this court when supported by
some substantial evidence." (Emphasis ours.)
This court has continued to follow the same rule of
decision down to the present time. Apparently the most
recent reaffirmation is in the case of Hackford v. Industrial Comm., (Ut.), 380 P.2d 927.
The problem presented to the court in this case
can be well stated by quoting from the language of this
court in the case of Peterson v. Industrial Comm., 102
Utah 175, 129 P.2d 563, where it is said:
"In the instant case we are not asked to
determine if there is any evidence to support the
finding of the commission. We are asked to determine that the probative force of the evidence
is such .as compels a finding contrary to that
made by the commission. The commission having
denied an award, found no liability on the insurance carrier or employer, we are asked to declare
that the evidence requires or compels a holding
to the contrary; that the findings are so against
the evidence as to find no support therein; that
there is nothing in the evidence upon which a
reasonable mind, a judicious mind could rest in
arriving at a conclusion, and therefore the conclusion must have been arrived at arbitrarily or
capriciously without regard to the evidence. * • •

"* * * To be a reasonable conclusion it must
be one for which from the evidence one can give
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re·asons which a judicious mind would deem
worthy of consideration, upon which it would be
content to rest a judgment. In the case of denial
of compensation, the record must disclose that
there is material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the conclusion as a matter of
law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily
and capriciously disregarded ther evidence, or unreasonably refused to believe such e·vidence. * * *

"* * * If there is substantial, competent eviernce to sustain it, then it cannot be said to be
arbitrary or capricious. * * *"
As shown by the authorities above sert forth, this
court has historically been reluctant to interfere with
the holdings of the Commission, and has reversed its
orders, or set aside its findings of fact, only in the
cleare'St of cases. One of the leading cases dealing with
the question of what is necessary to warrant a reversal
of the Commission on its findings of fact, was Kavalinakis v. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 174, 246 P. 698. The rule
there laid down is as follows:
"By what has been said we do not wish to be
understood as holding that there is no limit to
the commission's power or authority in disregarding or in refusing to give effect to uncontradicted evidence. The commission may not, without
any reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously
refuse to believe and to act upon credible evidence
which is unquestioned and undisputed. What we
hold is that in case the commission is charged
with having arbitrarily and capriciously refused
to consider credible evidence, and we are asked
to overturn the findings and conclusions of the
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commission which appear to be in conflict with
or contrary to the evidence, it must be clearly
m.ade to appear to us that the commission acted
arbitrarily or capriciously amd wholly without
C(J!Use in reje•cting or in refusing to give effect
to the evidence. We cannot set aside a finding
or conclusion of fact merely because we are of
the opinion that upon the face of the record the
commission refused to give effect to certain uncontradicted evidence. Before we cam set aside
f,indings or conclusions of fact, the fact that the
commission .acted arbitrarily or capriciously must
be so cle:ar and convincing that but one conclusion is permissible, and that we would be required
to issue a writ of mandate directing a specific
finding of dependency, as we are empowered to
do by subdivision (d) of section 3148, supra. Any
other conclusion would make this court merely a
reviewing court with power to weigh the probative
effect of the evidence." (Italics ours.)
In the case of Norris v. Ind. Comm., 90 Utah 256,
61 P.2d 413, this court further refined the principles of
the Kavalinakis case, and set forth definite criteria by
which to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings of the commission. The standards
there laid down were as follows :
"Where the matter presented on appeal is
the question of whether the commission should
have in law arrived at a conclusion of fact different from that at which it did arrive from the
evidence, a question of law is presented only when
it is claimed that the commission could only arrive
at the conclusion from the evidence, and that
it found contrary to that inevitable conclusion.
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But in order to reverse the comrn1sswn in this
regard it must .appear at l.east that (a) the evidence is uncontradicted, and (b) there is nothing
in the recor,d which is intrinsically discrediting
to the uncontradicted testimony and (c) that the
111ncontradict.ed evidence is not wholly that of
interested witnesses, or, if the uncontradicted evidence is wholly or partly from others than interested witnesses, that the record shows no bias
or prejudice on the part of such other witnesses,
and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such as
to carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable
mind and sustain the burden of proof, and (e)
precludes any other explanation o1r hypothesis as
being mo·re or .equally as reasonable, and (f)
there is nothing in the record which would indicate the presence of the witnesses gave the
commission such an advantage over the court
in aid to its conclusions that the conclusions
should for that reason be disturbed." (Emphasis
ours.)
The principles of the K avalinakis and N orri.s cases
have been oft repeated .and steadfastly followed, as illustrated by the following cases: Kent v. Ind. Comm., 89
Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724 ;O'Brien v. Ind Comm., 90 Utah 266,
61 P.2d 418; West v. Ind. Comm, 90 Utah 262, 61 P.2d
416; Milkovich v.l1'ud. Comm., 91 Utah 498, 64 P.2d 1920;
Johnson v. Ind. Comm., 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308; Stoddard v. Ind. Comm., 103 Utah 351, 135 P.2d 174; Lorange
v. Ind. Comm., 107 Uta;h 261, 153 P.2d 272; Bailey v.
Ind. Comm., 110 Utah 395, 174 P.2d 429.
Applying the tests of the Norris case to the facts
of this case, we find that at least four of the conditions
necessary for reversal are missing here:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
1. The evidence is not uncontradicted. The plaintiff
himself has not told an entirely consistent story, and
there is evidence from others that he has told entirely
different stories as to how the accident happened.
2. There is much in the record which discredits the
testimony of the plaintiff.
3. The claim of the plaintiff is based wholly upon
his own testimony, uncorroborated in any part, by that
of any disinterested witness.
4. The evidence presents at least an equal probability that the accident occurred in a manner different
from that contended by the plaintiff in this hearing.
It follows therefore, that plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proof and further, that he has wholly
failed to establish the matters necessary to warrant a
reversal of the findings .of the Industrial Commission.
Commencing at page 33 of his brief, plaintiff cites
several cases from other jurisdictions wherein compensation benetits were allowed for injuries or death of
emloyees while engaged in work in and about their
personal automobiles. However, an examination of those
cases will reveal that in every instance an award was
made in the first instance by the tribunal having original
jurisdiction of the claim, and the reviewing court merely
affirmed the action of the lower tribunal. In other
words, the Industrial Commission, or an equivalent court
or board, found as a matter of fact that the accident
arose out of, or in the course of, the employment. Such
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findings were uniformly upheld. Those decisions are
all entirely consistent with the position advocated by
defendants here, namely that the findings of faCJt of
the commission are not subject to review, and, when
supported by any substantial evidence, must be upheld.
For example, in Hilyard v. Lohmamn-Johms on Drilling
Co., (Kan.), 211 P.2d 89, cited in plaintiff's brief at
pages 34 and 35, the court said:
"It is the function of the trial court to pass
upon the facts in a workmen's compensation case,
and where its findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence they will not be disturbed on appeal. * * *
"The ,scope of this court's appellate review
is limited to 'questions of law', which in the final
analysis simply means that its duty is to determine whether the trial court's factual findings
are supported by any substantial, compentent
evidence. * * * "
And in Kingsley v. Donavan, 169 App. Div. 828, 155
N.Y.S. 801, cited in the plaintiff's brief at page 34, the
court in upholding the award by the State Compensation
Commission, wherein it was determined that the applicant was in the course of his employment, said: " . . .
under Sees. 22 and 21 of the Workmen's Compensation
law the decision of the commission is conclusive upon
the facts."
All of the other cases cited and relied upon by
plaintiff are to the same effect. Further, in all of these
cases, the evidence established that at the time of the
accident, the employee was either on, or in the vicinity

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
of his employer's premises ; or that the accident occurred
during regular working hours, or both. In addition, in
most of those cases, there was evidence that the employee
received some compensation or reimbursement for the
expense of operating his autombile in his employer's
business. In the instant suit the plaintiff was not on
his employer's premises, and he had no regular working
hours. The cost of operating and maintaining his automobile was borne entirely by himself. These decisions,
therefore, do not in any wise support the claim of the
plaintiff, but insofar as they are of any value at all as
guides or precedents to this court, they support the
position of defendants.
CONCLUSION
'The p1aintiff has the burden of proving that the
accident arose out of, or in the course of his employment,
hy a preponderance of the evidence. The only evidence
offered to support plaintiff's claim is his own uncorroborated testimony. The Industrial Commission elected
to believe the conflicting testimony of other witnesses.
Even plaintiff's own testimony establishes that he was
engaged in an activity outside the scope of his employment duties at the time the accident occurred. Therefore, under an unbroken line of precedents established
by this court, the order of the commission should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN AND JEN8EN
By RAY R. CHRI8TENSE,N
Att01rneys for defendants.
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